

POLITICAL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS

UDC 339.9(98)(045)+327(98)(045)

DOI: 10.17238/issn2221-2698.2019.36.57

New risks and opportunities for interstate cooperation in the Arctic *

© Pavel A. GUDEV, Cand. Sci. (Hist.), the leading researcher

E-mail: gudev@imemo.ru

Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Abstract. Despite the growing tension in Russia-West relations, the Arctic region continues to remain a zone of peace and cooperation. The level of interstate collaboration here is extremely high, unlike other maritime regions. The interaction is developing in scientific research, protection of the marine environment and biodiversity, regulation of fisheries, improvement of search and rescue efforts, control of oil spills, and regulation of navigation. However, interstate competition has not disappeared in the Arctic. The countries participating in the maritime activities in the region often have completely different priorities and are firmly defending their national interests. Under sanctions' pressure, the Russian Federation is forced to seek new partners and allies in the Arctic. This choice is extremely difficult since the coincidence of positions on one issue or another is often minimal. In order to defend its interests, Russia needs to achieve such a format of interaction with the Arctic and non-Arctic countries which would be extremely mutually beneficial and work for the good of our country, but not to its detriment.

Keywords: *the Arctic, the Arctic Council, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Spitsbergen, USA, NATO, EU, PRC.*

Introduction

The Arctic has long been one of the priority marine regions of our country, both in economic and strategic terms. Even though in Soviet times, it was closed for marine economic activities of foreign states. Some form of interstate cooperation and cooperation existed at a very modest scale.

The Murmansk speech of M.S. Gorbachev meant a de-facto complete "opening" of the Soviet Arctic for international cooperation. In the 1990s, its volumes were genuinely enormous: all the countries interested in the economic development of the Arctic and scientific research appeared in the region. Then, relying on resource development, the Russian Federation proceeds from the inevitability of interaction with others, first and foremost, the Arctic countries. However, since 2014 these hopes are no longer existing. Russia is under the sanctions pressure of Western countries. In this situation, it is not possible to achieve these goals without deciding on cooperation issues.

From our point of view, the development of international cooperation in the Arctic requires building a particular hierarchy of countries whose interests are, to a greater or lesser extent, correlated with the Russian interests in the marine region, incl. national security and its various dimensions (e.g., resource and environmental security). It should be borne in mind that this

* For citation:

Gudev P.A. New risks and opportunities for interstate cooperation in the Arctic. *Arktika i Sever* [Arctic and North], 2019, no. 36, pp. 57–83. DOI: 10.17238/issn2221-2698.2019.36.57

“dependence” of interest will fluctuate in the short, medium, and long terms. From our point of view, the presence of long-term joint investments is a crucial criterion for building any interaction.

From this point of view, the most considerable convergence of interests in the long run (!) exists between the Russian Federation and the other Arctic countries, adjacent to the Arctic Ocean (USA, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway). Despite the seeming inconsistency, it is since the Arctic Ocean is a joint maritime region for the five Arctic countries where they face common threats and challenges. The prospect of the “opening” the Arctic for more and more types of marine economic activities (shipping, offshore commercial fishing, oil and gas, marine tourism, etc.) confronts them with the overall objectives of the economic activity to prevent damage to the vulnerable marine Arctic environment and its biodiversity. Any environmental catastrophe in the Arctic harms the Arctic countries, and only then, as a result of the circulation of the World Ocean, can lead to negative consequences for others. Arctic nations are interested in the Arctic to be a region of peace and stability, where their interests would be recognized as a priority to the attention of non-Arctic states.

On the second level of the hierarchy are the permanent members of the Arctic Council — Iceland, Sweden, and Finland — as the Arctic states with a part territory located within the Arctic Circle, but not adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. Their involvement in the “Arctic issues” is a full-scale and multi-format and requires considering their interests in the region. They have long been involved in scientific research in the Arctic, have their expertise and capabilities in the Arctic economy/industry/technology, the use of which may be of interest to the Russian Federation.

The third level of the hierarchy — non-Arctic countries with an observer status in the Arctic Council (France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and India), own doctrinal/conceptual/strategic documents¹ on the Arctic issues, as well as specialized research centers. The growth of their interest in the Arctic cannot be stopped. It is fully institutionalized within the framework of the Arctic Council. Although they have no right to vote, and the permanent members of the Arctic Council can no longer be extended. Their goals in the Arctic are different but united by an interest in scientific research and the general concern about the marine environment and its biodiversity. Many of these countries have long been engaged in polar research, e.g., in the Antarctic, and raised more than one generation of polar researchers. Of course, their experience can only help to expand the scientific knowledge in the Arctic region.

Some more states, e.g., Estonia², Turkey, Mongolia, and others, are showing interest in obtaining observer status in the Arctic Council. As it is the case with the observer states of the Arctic Council, their ambitions are on environmental issues and economic (resource) potential of the Arctic. In this case, it should be noted that it is the ecological rhetoric on their part often serves

¹ Schulze Vincent-Gregor. Arctic Strategies Round-up 2017. URL: https://www.arctic-office.de/fileadmin/user_upload/www.arctic-office.de/PDF_uploads/Arctic_Strategies_EN_10.11.17.pdf (accessed 06 May 2019).

² Cooperation and Conflict in the Arctic: a roadmap for Estonia. URL: https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2013/ICDS_Report_-_Arctic_2014.pdf (accessed 16 March 2019).

the legal basis for considering their interests in the region. However, it appears that this approach is no more than ideology “cover” for their claims to the development and use of the Arctic areas and resources. The selection of potential partners for interaction among their number, from this point of view, should be based solely on the volume of the possible scientific research and how valuable will be the results of such studies.

Russia — US — Canada: interaction and conflict triangle

Washington radically revised its attitude to the Arctic: from a marginal region in the geographical sense, and it becomes one of the central areas of the World ocean³. A significant part of the projects — control of fishing regulation in the central part of the Arctic Ocean, increased regulation of shipping in the Bering Strait⁴ — the original US initiatives supported by the other Arctic countries.

Russian-American relations in the Arctic are peculiar to an absolute dualism. On the one hand, the opposition has not yet touched the Arctic. American experts and politicians of the past⁵ and present⁶ see the Arctic as an area where our countries share common interests and are forced to confront common threats, i.e., faced with the need to establish a two-way dialogue on various issues.

In the short term, in addition to the Bering Sea, the United States appear to support the project development of bilateral and trilateral cooperation (Russia — Norway — United States) in the Barents Sea region. Despite the cautious attitude of Russia towards this initiative, due to the concentration of its military-strategic potential there, certain aspects, e.g., concerning the control of shipping, can undoubtedly be mutually beneficial.

³ National Strategy for the Arctic Region. URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf (accessed 16 June 2019); Department of Defense Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region. URL: <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf> (accessed 16 June 2019); Department of Defense Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. URL: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed 16 June 2019); International Security Advisory Board: Report on Arctic Policy URL: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262585.pdf> (accessed 16 June 2019); The US Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. URL: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf (accessed 16 June 2019); United States Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030. URL: <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc949842/> (accessed 16 June 2019).

⁴ In May 2018 the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a joint Russian-American proposal to establish a recommended scheme of the traffic in the Bering Strait at its 99th session. See: IMO Approves New Shipping Corridors in Bering Sea to Improve Safety. URL: <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/imo-approves-new-shipping-corridors-bering-sea-improve-safety> (accessed 29 May 2019).

⁵ Rossiya i SSHA v Arktike: sotrudnichestvo radi vyzhivaniya [Russia and the United States in the Arctic: cooperation for the sake of survival]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiya-i-ssha-v-arktike-sotrudnichestvo-radi-vyzhivaniya/> (accessed 07 July 2019). (In Russ.)

⁶ Ipatova M.M. Arkticheskie priorityety SSHA: adaptatsiya k menyayushchimsya usloviyam [US Arctic priorities: adaptation to the changing conditions]. URL: https://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=502 (accessed 05 July 2019). (In Russ.)

The United States, even in recent policy documents on the Arctic 2019⁷, supported the approach of the Russian Federation, since the Arctic is a unique, semi-enclosed sea area where the interests of the Arctic States should be considered first. The US is quite skeptical about the expansion of the observers in the Arctic Council, incl. to obtain this status by the EU. Given the presence of the sea border between the two countries in the Arctic and a separating our coast Bering Strait, the US is ready to support any initiative for the control/regulation of marine economic activities, esp. on the part of non-regional countries.

In particular, the United States welcomes the establishment of closer cooperation between the forces of PS FSB of Russia and the US Coast Guard, incl. joint patrols in the Chukchi Sea. It is important to note that unlike the US Navy, the US CG takes a far less radical position regarding the activities of the Freedom of Navigation program: it does not consider the protection of freedom of navigation more critical than cooperation with Russia on various issues.

Of particular note is a very balanced US position on the archipelago of Svalbard: Washington continues to believe that all parties to the Treaty of Paris 1920 have equal rights of economic activity both on the archipelago [1, Pedersen T.], and in the sea areas around it (200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the corresponding mode of the continental shelf), formed by Norway (from Russian perspective — illegally) following the rules and provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 [2, Vilegzhanin A.N., Zilanov V.K., Sawa V.M.].

On the other hand, despite the conscious need to build cooperation, Russia continues to be a significant “challenge” to the United States in the Arctic. It applies not only to the charges in the “militarization” of the region but also to political and legal disputes. E.g., the official position of the State Department and the Pentagon, on the protection of the principle of freedom of navigation, incl. in the Arctic is unlikely to undergo any changes. The US will continue to insist that the national level of regulation of sailing along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), advocated by the Russian Federation, is illegitimate. They question the very definition of NSR as a “historically established transport communication,” calling it extralegal⁸. That is why we cannot exclude that as an even more significant deterioration in US-Russian relations, the US may directly challenge the Russian claims concerning the NSR through various activities under the program “Freedom of Navigation.” It cannot be just a diplomatic note of protest, but also a direct demonstration of the flag, incl. naval exercises or maneuvers.

Discussions on the need for such steps increased significantly at a high expert level in recent years. Moreover, the “trial ball” to challenge the Russian legal claims has been already

⁷Arctic Strategic Outlook 2019. URL: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5973939-Arctic-Strategic-Outlook-APR-2019.html> (accessed 10 July 2019). Department of Defense Arctic Strategy in 2019. Report to Congress. URL: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF> (accessed 10 July 2019).

⁸See: Gudev P.A. Severnyj morskoy put': nacional'naya ili mezhdunarodnaya transportnaya arteriya? [The Northern Sea Route: national or international transport artery?]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/severnyy-morskoy-put-natsionalnaya-ili-mezhdunarodnaya-transportnaya-arteriya/> (accessed 07 June 2019). (In Russ.)

launched: in December 2018, the US Navy went into Peter the Great Bay in the Far East⁹. Its waters (in the Soviet national legislation and at the level of the federal doctrine of law) have always been considered internal historical water allowing order entry of foreign warships and civilian vessels. This precedent has a direct relationship with the Arctic: Russia tends to view a part of the NSR area (e.g., bays of Laptev, Sannikov, Vilkitsky, and Shokalski) internal historical waters, while the United States considers the NSR from the perspective of international straits with the right of transit passage.

Thus, the probability of increased tensions between Russia and the US in the Arctic is existing. And from this point of view, to de-escalate, it would be appropriate to reflect on how to improve the model of bilateral cooperation, formed as early as during the Cold War. So, it's all about two agreements: "On the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas" (1972) and "On the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities" (1989). It appears that the long-overdue need for further improvement of the mutual agreement. Moreover, one would initiate a discussion on the development and adoption of some "Code of conduct" concerning the Arctic, which would fix a shared understanding of what types of naval activities in the region (incl. the various marine zones) may be considered valid and, vice versa, leading to the security threat and the local military conflict. It could be possible to apply the known formula "agree to disagree," which would allow Washington not to deviate from its legal assessments of the NSR and other Russian Arctic waters but to agree to maintain the status quo for the sake of the Arctic peace and stability. It would certainly serve the interests of the entire international community.

Climate change is particularly relevant to the Arctic, and it will also leave its mark on the US-Russian relations. Even though today's skeptical attitude of the US administration to the subject, its disappearance from the American agenda is unlikely. E.g., in March 2019, the Russian Academy of Sciences and The US National Academy of Sciences agreed to launch a project to study the impact of climate change on permafrost and ice in the Arctic Ocean¹⁰.

The United States will continue to insist that the Arctic states should reduce greenhouse gas emissions, making its industry more focused on clean technologies, widely introduce the so-called "green technologies." The American foreign policy rhetoric voices advocating the need to create a universal international regulatory development of mineral resources of the Arctic Ocean. The latter, of course, cannot but cause some apprehension in Russia, as due to a sanctions regime, it does not have access to such technologies and growth prospects of its economic and social development depends on energy exports, incl. the development of Arctic fields oil and gas. It can be predicted that in the case of the further growth of tension in the US-Russian relations, Washing-

⁹ US Navy Conducts First Post-Cold War FONOP in Peter the Great Bay, Off Russian Coast. The operation challenges what the United States sees as excessive Russian maritime claims. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/us-navy-conducts-first-post-cold-war-fonop-in-peter-the-great-bay-off-russian-coast/> (accessed 09 March 2019).

¹⁰ RAN i NacAkademiya nauk SSHA podpisali soglasenie o sotrudnichestve. Rech' idet o sotrudnichestve v oblasti nauchnyh, inzhenernyh i medicinskih issledovanij [The Russian Academy of Sciences and The US National Academy of Sciences signed a cooperation agreement. We are talking about cooperation in the field of scientific, engineering and medical studies]. URL: <https://tass.ru/nauka/6210819> (accessed 19 June 2019). (In Russ.)

ton's pressure on Moscow to limit its possibilities to produce hydrocarbons on the shelf of the Arctic seas will be strengthened.

Canada has been a traditional partner of our state concerning shipping regulations in the Arctic waters. Canada, like Russia, insists on the priority of the rules and provisions of national legislation on the control of navigation within its Arctic archipelagos¹¹, continuing to assume that all water within its limits is internal historical waters under full state sovereignty, and does not recognize international straits status (lobbied by the US) with the right of transit passage in respect of these waters. We are talking about the coincidence of one hundred percent legal positions of Russia and Canada regarding the regulation of shipping along the NSR and the North-West Passage (NWP).

However, in recent years, especially after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Ottawa does not publicly express its solidarity with the position of the Russian Federation in respect of the NSR. Moreover, Canada has taken an extremely critical place concerning the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Is it possible to reverse this negative trend in bilateral ties? The question is extremely complex. Nevertheless, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that Russia and Canada have the most extended coastlines in the Arctic and thus may qualify for priority account of their national interests of the region¹².

Problem areas in the Russian-Canadian relations are the question of defining the outer continental shelf. May 23, 2019, Canada applied to the relevant Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in respect of the continental margin in the Arctic Ocean¹³. It claims to be part of the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha and Mendeleev Rise¹⁴, which means the imposition of legal claims between Canada, on the one hand, and the three other Arctic countries — Russia, Denmark, and the US — on the other. The Commission is not empowered to make a distinction in the case of shelf overlap claims, and these contradictions can be resolved solely by politico-diplomatic methods in the course of two- and trilateral negotiations. The discussion already initiated¹⁵, and we can only hope for its success.

¹¹ Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. URL: http://library.arcticportal.org/1886/1/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf (accessed 16 October 2019); Canada's Northern Strategy. URL: <https://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf> (accessed 16 June 2019).

¹² Eksperty RSMD o perspektivah sotrudnichestva Rossii i Kanady v Arktike v tekushchej mezhdunarodnoj obstanovke [RCIA experts about the prospects of cooperation between Russia and Canada in the Arctic in the current international situation]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/eksperty-rsmd-o-perspektivakh-sotrudnichestva-rossii-i-kanad/?sphrase_id=28483539 (accessed 12 June 2019). (In Russ.)

¹³ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada. URL: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can1_84_2019.html (accessed 17 June 2019).

¹⁴ Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Executive Summary. URL: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can1_84_2019/CDA_ARC_ES_EN_secured.pdf (accessed 14 June 2019).

¹⁵ V Sovfede rasskazali o peregovorah Rossii, Danii i Kanady po Arktike [The Federation Council of Russia was told about the talks of Russia Denmark and Canada Arctic]. URL: <https://polit.ru/news/2019/05/25/arctic/> (accessed 18 June 2019). (In Russ.)

A very negative perception of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has also led to the fact that Canada has intensified discussion of the problems of native peoples of the Arctic. It is so since the Russian Federation, according to the representatives of Canada, pays insufficient attention to improving their quality of life. Canada has traditionally been an initiative to ensure that native peoples had a greater autonomy (incl. the creation of autonomous provinces on the Canadian example), and their representatives are involved in the management of the region. Despite the “humanistic pathos” of such proposals to some extent, they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Russian Constitution and often aimed at discrediting the efforts that Russia is making in this area.

Russia and the other permanent members of the Arctic Council

Russia and **Norway** — the Arctic neighbors that should predetermine the high demand in the interaction. Norway is not a member of the EU, but it supported the European sanctions against the Russian Federation. Previous cooperation in the oil and gas sector is practically suspended. We cannot rely on cooperation with Norway on the development of various oil and gas fields (e.g., the Shtokman).

At the same time, the cooperation between Norway, on the one hand, and the US and NATO, on the other, will not be reduced, but on the contrary, will increase as concerns the restoration of the naval potential of the Russian Federation. Also, the expansion of cooperation between Russia and Norway actively involved the US. They consider the waters of the Barents Sea a pilot project on the use of integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and the establishment of marine protected areas (MPA) that may limit marine economic activities.

Norway actively emphasizes the protection of the marine environment of the Barents Sea and biodiversity, advocating the more great introduction of the ecosystem and precautionary approaches¹⁶, the need for integrated spatial planning, matching the interests of different maritime users with each other [3, Pilyasov A.N., pp. 57–64]. Norway stands for maximum greening of marine economic activity, incl. the one of the Russian Federation. Russia cannot wholly ignore the greening process. However, close attention to the Kola Bay and the surrounding marine areas, where the naval and military-strategic potential of the country is focused, causes a caution in Moscow.

Norway consistently tries to change the provisions Svalbard Treaty (1920), which enabled all the parties to have equal rights for economic activity both on the archipelago and the surrounding sea areas. Norwegian side works on replacing the Treaty with the norms and provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) [4, Pedersen T.]. References to the UNCLOS and its

¹⁶Norway's Arctic Strategy - between geopolitics and social development. URL: <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/fad46f0404e14b2a9b551ca7359c300/arctic-strategy.pdf> (accessed 19 March 2019).

rule allow Oslo to violate the Svalbard Treaty (1920) and to introduce more control, to restrict and prohibit certain activities (e.g., the harvest of aquatic biological resources)¹⁷.

The position of Russia and some other countries (e.g., Iceland) bases on the fact that the Treaty 1920 gave Norway no legal basis for the establishment of a 12-mile territorial sea around Svalbard, and the 200-mile exclusive mode (fishing/fishery protection) and a corresponding zone of the continental shelf to it. Only the parties of the Treaty 1920 have the right to agree on the establishment of maritime zones around Svalbard and to determine their legal status. Such coordination is possible only within the framework of convening a new international conference on Svalbard, which would clearly define a new volume of the rights and powers of Norway in its relation [5, Anderson D.].

Thus, Russian-Norwegian relations are hardly unambiguous. However, the scope for cooperation remain joint research in the Arctic, the improvement of navigation and hydrographic information on the Barents Sea, the development of updated nautical charts, the adoption of collective measures on shipping regulation (vessel traffic separation schemes) and enhancing cooperation in search and rescue (6, Vylegzhanin A.N.).

Denmark has the status of the Arctic state solely because of its autonomous territory — Greenland. The country is extremely concerned about the protection of its interests in the region¹⁸. It is manifested in active support of the EU's greater involvement in the Arctic issues and the approval of the growing NATO influence in the Arctic.

On the other hand, Denmark, like the US and the UK, advocates equal rights for all members of the Svalbard Treaty 1920 for economic activity both on the archipelago and the surrounding sea areas [7, Pedersen T.]. Denmark is not disputing the legitimacy of the direct formation of the marine regions around the archipelago under its sovereignty and jurisdiction. The country is not inclined to support the Oslo's policy of radical reduction of the rights granted to all participants in the Treaty 1920. Thus, the Russian Federation may be very interested in the Danish position to form a consolidated group of opponents for Norwegian claims concerning Spitsbergen.

Russia and Denmark have the imposition of claims to the continental shelf in the central part of the Arctic Ocean beyond the 200-mile zone from the baselines. Copenhagen claims reach up to the outer limit of the Russian EEZ, challenging the way the Russian Federation jurisdiction over a sufficiently large part of the continental margin in the Arctic. It is evident, in this case, there is a maximum possible to Inquire Denmark's position that seeks a basis for further negotiations with the Russian side¹⁹. And just as in the situation with Canada (see above), the settlement of

¹⁷Koptelov V. Rossiya i Norvegiya v Arktike [Russia and Norway in the Arctic]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiya-i-norvegiya-v-arktike> (accessed 13 May 2019). (In Russ.)

¹⁸Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. URL: <http://library.arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2019).

¹⁹Tulupov D. Uroki zanimatel'noj delimitacii: kak pravil'no razdelit' arkticheskij shel'f? [Lessons of entertaining delimitation: how to divide the Arctic shelf correctly?]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/uroki-zanimatel'noj-delimitatsii-kak-pravilno-razdelit-arktich/?sphrase_id=28424984 (accessed 17 May 2019). (In Russ.)

these conflicts will not be the competence of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It is only authorized to review the scientific data presented on the shelf belonging to a particular state.

Like many other Arctic countries, Denmark is ready to pay much attention to the quality of life of the native people of the North, in particular — the Greenland Eskimos. In this case, in contrast to the critical attitude of Canada regarding the lack of Russian efforts to protect their interests, Denmark is practicing a more balanced approach without any sharp condemnation. Moreover, Russia and Denmark have a lot in common in this area: so, both countries are in favor of the legal justification for native peoples have to save their legitimate right to be engaged in traditional occupations (in Denmark, it is seal hunting and whaling²⁰).

Common interests are observed in research: Denmark is actively studying the melting of the ice sheet and the subglacial process of permafrost in Greenland. Russia considers the melting of permafrost on its territory, incl. the Arctic.

Denmark is among the ten largest shipping nations. Maersk is a leader in the container shipping market, occupying 18% of the market. It is no coincidence; Copenhagen examines the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)²¹. In August — September 2018, a container carrier Venta Maersk made a test flight from the South Korean port of Pusan via Vladivostok and on to St. Petersburg with frozen fish²². Maersk has three container terminals in Russia (in Nakhodka and St. Petersburg). So, cooperation in this field can be significantly enhanced if it is clear what goods and where it will be possible to carry on the NSR²³.

Iceland, under its geographical position and place in the system of international relations, is also very interested in strengthening its influence in the Arctic. And although it is not a member of the European Union like Norway, Iceland acts in favor of the broadest possible EU presence in the region, supporting the granting of the last observer status in the Arctic Council²⁴. Iceland is trying to prevent the formation of any semblance of the “Arctic coalition” of the vital regional powers, which would have closed the responsibility for solving the critical issues in the region.

²⁰ V Rossii korennoe naselenie Chukotki poluchaet kvoty na kitobojny promysel v ramkah Mezhdunarodnoy kitobojnoy komissii (MKK). Kommerchesky promysel zapreshchyon. Kvota 2018 g. na dobychu kitov dlya Rossiiskoy Federacii sostavila 140 osobey [In Russia, the native people of Chukotka received quotas for whaling by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Commercial whaling is prohibited. Quota 2018 on whaling for the Russian Federation amounted to 140 whales]. URL: http://www.mnr.gov.ru/press/news/kvota_na_dobychu_kitov_dlya_rossiyskoy_federatsii_sostavit_140_osobey_v_god_/?special_version=Y (accessed 01 July 2019). (In Russ.)

²¹Koptelov V. Strategiya Danii v osvoenii Arktiki [Denmark's strategy for the development of the Arctic]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/strategiya-danii-v-osvoenii-arktiki/> (accessed 01 July 2019). (In Russ.)

²²Maersk proverit sposobnost' Sevmorputi konkurovat' s Sueckim kanalom [Maersk checks the NSR's ability to compete with the Suez Canal]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/business/21/08/2018/5b7c0fc19a794737b8cfeb8f> (accessed 02 July 2019). (In Russ.)

²³Maersk izuchaet vozmozhnost' zapuska transporta po Severnomu morskomu puti [Maersk is exploring the possibility of transport run on the Northern Sea Route]. URL: <https://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/120451> (accessed 02 July 2019). (In Russ.)

²⁴Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy. URL: <https://www.government.is/media/utanrikisraduneyti-media/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2019).

Iceland is trying to strengthen its status of an Arctic state and developing active cooperation with China. It is reflected in the joint operation of the newly built observatory, bilateral agreements on free trade, the desire to attract Chinese investment in port infrastructure, and the growing flow of Chinese tourists to Iceland²⁵. Iceland, along with Greenland and Spitsbergen, serves a convenient base to strengthen China's presence in the Arctic, incl. for global transportation and energy projects. However, China is striving to consolidate its leading position in the Arctic. It may be a desire to change the exclusive character of the Arctic cooperation, replacing it with a wider variant — an inclusive one.

Russian Federation considers the cooperation with Iceland essential to develop in the political and legal spheres, as the latter has always spoken strongly against the policy of Norway on the establishment of maritime zones around Svalbard to limit the rights of third countries in these waters. The correlation between the two countries on this issue is absolute: such zones can only be created following the results of a new international conference on Svalbard. It is impossible to be made by one side decisions took by Norway when using the UNCLOS (1982) provisions.

It should also be borne in mind that Iceland has vast experience in geothermal energy. Its knowledge may be useful for the Russian Federation. Innovative technologies of harvesting and fish processing is a promising area for Russian-Icelandic cooperation²⁶. Now Iceland is ready to participate in the development and modernization of the Russian fishing fleet, offering its knowledge and technology. Iceland's program for its Arctic Council chair 2019 concerns projects on “green” navigation, mapping of vulnerable Arctic and North Atlantic marine areas from shipping, and the fight against marine litter and oxidation of the World Ocean. Of course, it will be supported by Moscow. Iceland shows interest in the NSR, considering itself as a transit hub²⁷.

Finland — our neighbor. We have amicable relations and historically close economic interaction. Moreover, Finland is extremely interested in establishing any form of economic cooperation with Russia, especially in areas that are not cropped by the sanction regime²⁸. It positions itself as a possible supplier of “green” technologies and telecommunication and navigation equip-

²⁵ Tulupov D. Islandiya: ostrov “svobody” v Arktike [Iceland: island of “freedom” in the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/islandiya-ostrov-svobody-v-arktike/?sphrase_id=28415438 (accessed 15 June 2019). (In Russ.)

²⁶ Studneva E. Rossiya i Islandiya: arkticheskoe prityazhenie [Russia and Iceland: arctic attraction]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/rossiya-i-islandiya-arkticheskoe-prityazhenie/?sphrase_id=28415438 (accessed 14 June 2019). (In Russ.)

²⁷ Nam ne nraivitsya, kogda chuzhaki govoryat nam, chto delat'. Prezident Islandii Gvyudni Jouhannesson — o sovместnom s Rossiej razvitiij Sevmorputi i o skhozhesti dvuh narodov [We do not like outsiders telling us what to do. President of Iceland Gvyudni Jóhannesson - about joint development of the Northern Sea Route with Russia and the similarity of the two nations]. URL: <https://iz.ru/866039/dmitrii-laru-elnar-bainazarov/nam-ne-nraivitsia-kogda-chuzhaki-govoriat-nam-chto-delat> (accessed 17 June 2019). (In Russ.)

²⁸ Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013. URL: https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/334509/Arktinen_strategia_2013_en.pdf/6b6fb723-40ec-4c17-b286-5b5910fbecf4 (accessed 06 April 2019).

ment. Its shipbuilding industry is ready to take on new orders from Russia²⁹. Finland shows interest in the technical and logistical projects in the Russian Arctic³⁰.

Finland is the only Arctic country with no public concern caused by increased naval building in Northern Russia. Also, Finland does not consider Moscow a threat to its security in the Arctic. Moreover, being a member of the EU, Finland, on the one hand, demonstrates no objections to the possibility of the EU observer status in the Arctic Council, but on the other hand, it claims to be the focal point for the EU Arctic policy³¹ and is ready to act as a facilitator/moderator in relations between the EU and the Russian Arctic.

Sweden, a member of the Arctic Eight, is not interested in the domination of the Arctic Five (Russia, USA, Norway, Denmark, and Canada) in the Arctic Council. It seeks the voices of Iceland, Finland, and Sweden to be considered not to a lesser extent in decision-making³². That is why Sweden has always advocated the strengthening of the Arctic Council, and its transformation to a full-fledged international organization to prevent the weakening of the AC³³. At the same time, Sweden is for greater involvement of the EU in the Arctic issues. It is not correlated with the interests of the Russian Federation.

Moreover, the ongoing speculation about the possible participation of Sweden in NATO only increases the tension in Russian-Swedish relations. We should not forget that a few years ago, Scandinavian countries lobbied for the creation of the “mini-NATO” of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania primarily to counter the Russian “militarization” of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. So, it explains why the range of cooperation areas between Russia and other countries in the Arctic is extremely narrow. It is the protection of the marine environment and biodiversity, the study of climate change and the preservation of traditional ways of life of native peoples of the North.

Non-regional countries

It is possible to build a hierarchy among the full range of non-regional countries with quite a severe interest in the Arctic region. The states with a priority to establish cooperation and collaboration, incl. the international one, are countries with research arctic or polar research programs that have the history and require to accumulate research experience. And finally, these are the countries for which the scientific problem is not just a tool linking them to the Arctic, but they are also willing to share their scientific research results or to start joint research. Thus, science and

²⁹ It should be recalled that in Soviet times, a half of the Russian icebreaker fleet was built at the Finnish shipyards.

³⁰ Telegin E. Morgunov M. *Strategiya Finlyandii v osvoenii Arktiki* [Finland's strategy for the development of the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/strategiya-finlyandii-v-osvoenii-arktiki/?sphrase_id=28415438 (accessed 18 June 2019). (In Russ.)

³¹ Shlyamin V. Titov I. *Finlyandiya v Arktike* [Finland in the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/finlyandiya-v-arktike/?sphrase_id=28415438 (accessed 17 June 2019). (In Russ.)

³² Koptelov V. *Arkticheskaya strategiya Shvecii* [Swedish Arctic strategy]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/arkticheskaya-strategiya-shvetsii/?sphrase_id=28483539 (accessed 19 June 2019). (In Russ.)

³³ Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region. URL: <https://www.government.se/49b746/contentassets/85de933bbbe4373b55eddd7f71608da/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region> (accessed 14 April 2019).

protecting the fragile Arctic marine environment and its biodiversity have a top priority in these countries, not just a desire to be engaged in the exploration and development of the Arctic areas and resources.

E.g., the **European Union** is investing enough financial resources to complete marine scientific research in the Arctic³⁴. And it is the crucial justification when the EU is claiming the observer status in the Arctic Council³⁵. However, it seems as long as the regime of economic sanctions exists, and the EU does not cease to declare the Russian militarization of the Arctic and to insist on more significant involvement of NATO in the Arctic, it is unlikely such approaches to be supported by the Russian Federation. Moreover, the EU position on the legal status of the Northern Sea Route continues to be directly contrary to the opinion of Russia: It stands for maximum internationalization of shipping on the NSR tracks. Here, the EU got support from the other states: esp., **Germany**³⁶, and **Spain**³⁷.

Finally, the EU's role in the Arctic has changed little in recent years. It continues to see itself as a "normative power," which means it proposes standards and patterns of behavior which should be adopted by all regional actors³⁸. E.g., we are talking about the need for higher environmental standards for marine economic activities, which are often in direct conflict with the interests of the socio-economic development of the Arctic countries, incl. the Russian Federation. The only area where the EU and Russian interests in the Arctic overlap is the safety of navigation and the reduction of emissions. In particular, the EU supports the idea of using LNG instead of heavy fuel for vessels engaged in shipping in the Arctic. Russia also expressed interest in such a project.

Pretentious position in the Arctic is relevant for such European countries like **Great Britain**³⁹ and **France**. They present themselves the pioneers in the field of polar research, advocate the maximum possible EU involvement in the Arctic, and worry about military and non-military security aspects in the Arctic.

³⁴ Ruzakova B. Arkticheskaya strategiya ES: integrirovannyj podhod 2016 [Arctic strategy of the EU: integrated approach 2016]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/valeriya-ruzakova/31105/?sphrase_id=28424984 (accessed 22 June 2019). (In Russ.)

³⁵ Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012JC0019&from=EN> (accessed 11 April 2019); European Parliament and the Council - Developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic region: progress since 2008 and next steps. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/swd_2012_182.pdf (accessed 02 April 2019); EU Arctic policy in regional context. URL: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578017/EXPO_STU\(2016\)578017_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578017/EXPO_STU(2016)578017_EN.pdf) (accessed 18 March 2019); Report on an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic. URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0032+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> (accessed 11 April 2019); Integrated European Union policy for the Arctic. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0021&from=EN> (accessed 13 April 2019).

³⁶ Guidelines of the Germany Arctic policy Assume responsibility, seize opportunities. URL: https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien-Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 17 April 2019).

³⁷ Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy. URL: http://www.ciencia.gob.es/stfls/MICINN/Investigacion/FICHEROS/Comite_Polar_definitivo/Directrices_estrategia_polar_espanola.pdf (accessed 02 April 2019).

³⁸ Utkin S. ES i Arktika: prismaticrivayas' drug k drugu [EU and the Arctic: scrutinizing each other]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/es-i-arktika-prismaticrivayas-k-budushchemu/> (accessed 21 June 2019). (In Russ.)

³⁹ Beyond the ice: UK policy towards the Arctic. URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/697251/beyond-the-ice-uk-policy-towards-the-arctic.pdf (accessed 03 March 2019).

In particular, **the United Kingdom** strongly supported the project of “mini-NATO” with the participation Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The aim of the project would be the opposition to the Russian “militarization” of the Arctic⁴⁰. At the same time, the Russian approach partly supported by the other Arctic countries, based on the idea that Arctic countries should resolve all the Arctic security problems, both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, without involving any extra-regional countries and especially NATO.

France, on the one hand, rightly positioned itself as a polar nation⁴¹. This status grounds on the fact that the French have been engaged in polar research for decades, and they raised a generation of experts. Oceanographic research and marine environmental protection — the traditional “strong point” of France. Also, among the French overseas territories — islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, located in the North Atlantic to the south of Newfoundland, owned by the Arctic country — Canada. Although the coordinates of the northern point of the French islands — 47 ° NL and the Arctic Circle is — 66 °NL, the appeal of Paris to the fact that in the North Atlantic has very similar climatic conditions to the Arctic Ocean, can be recognized conditionally correct.

On the other hand, France is not just supporting the EU observer status in the Arctic Council. But in general, it speaks for empowering the AC observers believing that the management of the Arctic is not a question of the regional and international responsibility⁴². This position, of course, does not get support not only in Russia but in other Arctic states, opposed the exclusive nature of their cooperation in the region.

Italy was granted observer status in the Arctic Council, and it is actively pursuing its Arctic strategy⁴³. It positions itself a country more than 100 years involved in Arctic issues. Considering the Arctic Ocean as a fragile ecosystem, Italians draw an analogy with the Alpine ecosystem, the protection of which (from the Italian point of view) is like those that exist in the Arctic.

Italy highlights four main dimensions related to the Arctic region: political, economic, environmental, and social. In the field of governmental regulation, Italy recognizes the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Arctic states and posits the idea that the protection of the Arctic is the responsibility of all international communities. It serves to support greater involvement of the EU and the European Commission in Arctic issues. In the field of economic cooperation, incl. Russia, Italy, is ready to offer its expertise in satellite monitoring, naval architecture, navigation, and energy. Although Eni and Rosneft's joint project has been frozen due to the sanction regime, Italy continues to be one of the leaders in the use of environmentally friendly technology exploration and devel-

⁴⁰ Shaparov A. NATO i novaya povestka dnya v Arktike [NATO and a new agenda in the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/nato-i-novaya-povestka-dnya-v-arktike/?sphrase_id=28483539 (accessed 23 June 2019). (In Russ.)

⁴¹ Great challenge of the Arctic. National Roadmap for the Arctic. URL: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/frna_-_eng_-_interne_-_prepa_-_17-06-pm-bd-pdf_cle02695b.pdf (accessed 06 April 2019).

⁴² Lagutina A.M. Novaya rol' Francii v Arktike [New French Role in the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/novaya-rol-francii-v-arktike/?sphrase_id=28510615 (accessed 21 June 2019). (In Russ.)

⁴³ Verso una strategia italiana per l'Artico. URL: https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa/artico/ (accessed 12 May 2019).

opment of hydrocarbon resources. Russia meets the Italian interests in the event of a so-called low-carbon economy, due to the promotion of natural gas as the primary fuel. Italy is ready to develop cooperation with Russia in oceanographic and meteorological research, lifestyle study in the North, climate change, protection of biodiversity, countering accidents, etc.

Netherlands's main interest in the Arctic binds to the climate change, leading to a decrease in the ice cover, raising global sea level, the impact on marine biodiversity, and increasing the number of natural disasters and phenomena, which together may adversely impact the country's coastline⁴⁴. Before the sanctions, the British-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell could become an active player in the exploration and development of Arctic hydrocarbon, and the development of the NSR was associated with a significant economic interest in Amsterdam. However, sanctions nullified all prospects for cooperation, except for some projects. Also, the problem was and still is the fact that Netherlands sees its participation in Arctic research a part of increasing EU presence in the Arctic. Its representatives advocate for the EU observer in the Arctic Council [8, pp. 44–51].

Amsterdam disposes of one of the most influential law schools in the field of international maritime law, and voices for strict compliance with are norms for the Arctic states. This position affected the relations with Moscow until recently, as after the arrest of the Greenpeace “Arctic Sunrise” vessel, sailing under the Dutch flag, for the protests near the Prirazlomnaja platform in 2013, both sides had different ideas about how to classify the incident and Russian reaction. Netherlands stood for the concept than UNCLOS provisions were violated and filed a lawsuit to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)⁴⁵, and in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in Hague⁴⁶. Russia believed that the international courts had no jurisdiction to review Dutch claims, as this situation was concerned with the violation of the domestic Russian legislation. However, in May 2019, the Russian government without changing its legal position agreed to pay half of the compensation that Amsterdam had been awarded by arbitration when signing a joint statement on scientific cooperation between the countries in the Russian Arctic and the settlement of the dispute⁴⁷. It is undoubtedly an excellent example of an inter-state compromise for the sake of collaboration and interaction. However, any Dutch attempts to link the change of the Russian position on the “Arctic Sunrise” case to the investigation of the Malaysian Boeing crash looks entirely speculative⁴⁸.

⁴⁴Pole Position - NL 2.0. Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Programme 2016-2020. URL: https://www.nwo.nl/binaries/content/documents/nwo-en/common/documentation/application/alw/netherlands-polar-programme---strategy---pole-position---nl-2.0/UK_binnenwerk_Poolpositie-NL+2.0.pdf (accessed 12 May 2019).

⁴⁵The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures. URL: <https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-22/> (accessed 03 July 2019).

⁴⁶The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia). URL: <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/21/> (accessed 03 July 2019).

⁴⁷Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Scientific Cooperation in the Russian Arctic Region and the Settlement of a Dispute. URL: <https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2019/05/17/joint-statement-of-the-russian-federation-and-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-on-scientific-cooperation-in-the-russian-arctic-region-and-the-settlement-of-a-dispute> (accessed 04 July 2019).

⁴⁸Russian-Dutch settlement on Arctic Sunrise is a recognition of international law. URL: <https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/europa/1297-russian-dutch-settlement-on-arctic-sunrise-is-a-recognition-of-international-law> (accessed 04 July 2019).

Poland has not officially adopted the Arctic strategy, but the goals the Polish Arctic experts put are ambitious enough⁴⁹. Warsaw is aware of the benefits of a scientific co-operation. Science diplomacy stimulates the development of political cooperation between the states. Science is regarded as an “entry ticket” to the Arctic. Participation in the Arctic “affairs,” of course, raises the international status of Poland, both within the EU and at the transatlantic level. Poland especially emphasizes its participation in the Svalbard Treaty since 1931. It has a research station there. The country is an observer in the Arctic Council since 1996, and it initiated “Warsaw negotiations” intending to take on the role of moderator for the non-Arctic states and their discussions.

Polish interests in the Arctic are not only climate change and protection of the marine environment, but also to specific sectors of the economy: production of hydrocarbons and rare earth metals; the use of national shipbuilding capacity; harvesting of aquatic biological resources. Transportation opportunities in the region are also attractive for Warsaw: Polish ports and container terminals in the Baltic Sea (Gdansk, etc.) may be the beneficiaries of the NSR through which Chinese goods will be transported to Western and Eastern Europe, and esp. to Belarus and Ukraine.

The only problem is the status of the NSR. Its open condition is favorable for Poland as well as the use of the UNCLOS rather than the Russian national legislation. Also, Warsaw sees a way of strengthening its presence in the Arctic only through greater involvement of the EU and NATO. In particular, Poland still has not developed the Arctic strategy for the simple reason that its views on the region fully coincide with those recorded in the EU documents. As for the NATO, the Polish experts insist that security in the Arctic should be provided exclusively by the NATO without provocation of Russia to take countermeasures⁵⁰.

Asian allies and competitors

India has traditionally given priority to Antarctic research. In recent years, considering the importance of climate change, it has begun to pay more attention to the Arctic⁵¹. India is a full member of the Svalbard Treaty 1920 and has a research station on the archipelago. Delhi has observer status in the Arctic Council, which is certainly advantageous for the Russian Federation, considering the two-way interaction within BRICS. In the context of the sanction regime, Delhi and Moscow's cooperation in shipbuilding, energy (esp. investment) climate study may be significantly expanded.

However, India's position on the critical issues in the Arctic (regulatory models of naval operations, the legal status of NSR) does not always coincide with the national interests of Russia. India continues to view the Arctic as a “common” maritime region, where extra-regional countries

⁴⁹ Michał Łuszczuk, Piotr Graczyk, Adam Stępień, Małgorzata Śmieszek. Poland's Policy towards the Arctic: Key Areas and Priority Actions. URL: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191034/PISM Policy Paper no 11 \(113\). pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191034/PISM_Policy_Paper_no_11_(113).pdf) (accessed 19 June 2019).

⁵⁰ Piotr Kościński, Wojciech Lorenz, Lidia Puka. Poland in the Arctic: Seeking the Balance. URL: <https://slidex.tips/download/introduction-piotr-kociski-wojciech-lorenz-lidia-puka> (accessed 13 June 2019).

⁵¹ Lunev S. Indiya ustremilas' v Arktiku [India rushed to the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/indiya-ustremilas-v-arktiku/?sphrase_id=28510615 (accessed 19 June 2019). (In Russ.)

would better have a certain similarity to the Antarctic Treaty for equal access for all states to the Arctic areas and resources [9, pp. 5–17]. Besides, Delhi supports the idea of nuclear-free status for the Arctic, which is hard will meet the military-strategic interests of Russia and the US. Concerning the NSR, India has a certain skepticism, fearing that its development will take over some of the traffic that currently goes through the Indian Ocean.

Japan had polar research since 1959 when it joined the Antarctic Treaty. This fact means a generation of polar researchers, knowledge, and experience, which can be useful for the study of the Arctic. Even earlier, in 1935, Japan became a party to the Svalbard Treaty. But the country has not still formulated a clear position concerning the Oslo policies aimed at the replacement of the Svalbard Treaty provisions with the UNCLOS [10, Gutenev M.Yu.]. At the same time, Japan is an island (archipelagic) state and justifies its interest in the Arctic by climate change in the Arctic, its consequences for the oceans (incl. the increase in water level) and impacts on Japan ⁵².

Tokyo has traditionally (since Soviet times) been interested in the development of the NSR, which can be closed at the Japanese port of Yokohama. This interest manifested itself after the famous speech of M.S. Gorbachev in Murmansk (1987) and his idea to open the NSR for international navigation. In the 1990s and 2000s, Tokyo was one of the organizers of studies and expeditions to evaluate all the pros and cons of using the NSR. It should also be borne in mind that Japan represented about 10% of the world seaborne trade [11, Mogilevkin I.M. p. 197], and the Japanese fleet took 2nd place in the world in terms of tonnage ⁵³.

However, Japan supports the norms and provisions of international law. So, it acts with the support of the exclusive use of the UNCLOS for the Arctic and upholds the need to respect the principle of freedom of navigation. It contradicts the Russian position on the issue.

Moreover, Japan's policy documents on the Arctic reveal active participation in the emerging regional management system and the will to be a guarantor of international law ⁵⁴. Such claims from Tokyo to strengthen its influence in the Arctic are clear enough, especially considering the growing intensification of Arctic policy in Beijing and Seoul. However, they can be presented too ambitious for the Arctic states.

Singapore, being, along with Japan, an island nation, is also interested in the Arctic due to its possible influence on the world climate system and Oceans ⁵⁵. Besides, covering approximately 70% of the world market of floating units for production, storage, and transportation of oil, Singapore is interested in expanding its participation in oil and gas projects in the region. Its port facili-

⁵²Fedotova A. Yaponiya v Arktike: kompleksnaya strategiya razvitiya regiona [Japan in the Arctic: a comprehensive strategy for the region]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/arctic/31245/?sphrase_id=28424984 (accessed 11 May 2019). (In Russ.)

⁵³The Review of Maritime Transport 2018 by UNCTAD. URL: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2018_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2019).

⁵⁴Japan's Arctic Policy. October 16th, 2015. URL: https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/pdf/japans_ap_e.pdf (accessed 19 March 2019).

⁵⁵Dereschuk A. Interesy Singapura v Arktike [Singapore's interests in the Arctic]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/arctic/31229/?sphrase_id=28424984 (accessed 12 April 2016). (In Russ.)

ties and the fleet (more than 3.5 thous vessels) aimed at cargo base service, going through the Suez Canal, could be employed for the development of transit along the NSR [9, pp. 48–55].

The Republic of Korea, as well as many other Asian countries, considers its involvement in the Arctic as an element of enhancing its international status⁵⁶. It is evident that strengthening presence in the Arctic, participation in its development is possible only for successful states⁵⁷, as well as involvement in Antarctic research, which started back in Seoul 1986.

Transport potential of the Arctic, just as the exploration and development of energy resources, is of interest to Seoul. But, e.g., the harvest of aquatic biological resources is considered by all Asian countries a pivotal element to ensure their food security and guarantee of the further socio-economic development. A highly developed shipbuilding sector makes the Republic of Korea very interested in receiving new orders for the design and construction of ships for Arctic waters [12, Zhuravel V.P.]. It is worth mentioning about 2 / 3 of the LNG carriers in the world were built on the Korean shipyards [13, Gutenev M.Yu.]. Russian company Novatek ordered a series of ice-breaking tankers for the Yamal LNG project in Korea.

In this case, Korea is actively involved in the development of science diplomacy through the various forms of international cooperation, joint research, and business projects in the Arctic. Seoul is engaged in climate change research in the Arctic, drafting of the relief maps of the Arctic seabed, and development of technology for deep seabed energy resources [14, Dongmin Jin]. This balanced and conflict-free approach, of course, gets support from the Russian government and the relevant experts.

Somewhat contradictory position on the Arctic takes **China**⁵⁸. Thus, China claims that the very development of the situation in the Arctic is beyond the region and the interests of the Arctic countries. It has vital importance not only for the extra-regional players but also for the entire international community⁵⁹. It declared the situation there depends on “survival, development, and the common future of all mankind.”

China sees itself as a state ready to be responsible for the production and improvement of the rules of conduct in the Arctic, more than that — the control system in the Arctic region⁶⁰. The purpose of such a system is exceptionally universalist, i.e., to create conditions for the protection,

⁵⁶Nacional'naya gordost' i kommercheskie vozmozhnosti vlekut Yuzhnyuyu Koreyu v Arktiku [National pride and commercial opportunities involve South Korea, the Arctic]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/natsionalnaya-gordost-i-kommercheskie-vozmozhnosti-vlekut-yu/> (accessed 01 April 2019). (In Russ.)

⁵⁷Zachem Azii Arktika? [Why Asia needs Arctic?]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/zachem-azii-arktiki/> (accessed 02 April 2019). (In Russ.)

⁵⁸China's Arctic Policy. URL: http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (accessed 18 April 2019).

⁵⁹Tulupov D. Chlenstvo Kitaya v arkticheskom Sovete [Membership of China in the Arctic Council]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/chlenstvo-kitaya-v-arkticheskom-sovete/> (accessed 12 April 2019). (In Russ.)

⁶⁰See: Gudev P.A. Arkticheskie ambicii Podnebesnoj [Arctic ambitions of China]. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/number/Arkticheskie-ambicii-Podnebesnoi-19751> (accessed 12 May 2019). (In Russ.)

development, and management of the Arctic for the benefit of all humanity⁶¹. Very ambitious, China sees itself as a state — “norm-taker” but wants to become a “law-maker” [15, Timo Koivurova, p. 26].

China is ready to cooperate not only with the Arctic states but also with all other countries and members of the international community, incl. international and non-governmental institutions and organizations. It is an ambitious attempt to lead the process of strengthening the role of external actors in the Arctic, well-camouflaged desire to play a leading role in the Arctic agenda.

China is positioning itself as a “near-Arctic” state, referring to the fact that it is a full member of the Svalbard Treaty 1920. The reference to the Svalbard Treaty is essential for China, as it allows it to position itself a country that, since 1925, for more than 90 years, has been involved in Arctic issues. Also, since the early 2000s, Svalbard became a kind of scientific foothold for China in the Arctic, and the country is not willing to lose its presence there. However, the reference to such a rich history of presence in the Arctic looks strange. Unlike the Soviet Union/Russia with a long history of presence in the archipelago and its legal grounds (Russian Pomors opened and actively explored the land and water of the archipelago), the first Beijing interest in Svalbard revealed only at the beginning of the 1990s.

Besides, Beijing's position on the legal status of the archipelago and the extent of the projection of Norway's sovereignty over it is still unclear. Although China claims equal rights on the archipelago and in the waters around it, the country is hardly ready to go on intensifying the confrontation with Oslo on this issue. China prefers to refer to the use of only the norms and the UNCLOS justifying its legal claims on the development and exploitation of the Svalbard area and its resources. As a result, Beijing's strategy in this matter is straightforward: it will oppose any restrictions on the rights of the parties to the Treaty on Svalbard, but never declare the priority of the Treaty over the UNCLOS.

China's position concerning the NSR also has a certain inconsistency. So, on the one hand, China respects the legislative, law enforcement, and judicial powers of the Arctic States in the waters under their jurisdiction. One might think Beijing recognizes a national regulatory level. However, on the other hand, China emphasizes the management of Arctic shipping routes shall be following the treaties, incl. UNCLOS, and general international law, and that the freedom of navigation, which is used by all countries and their right to the use of Arctic sea routes, must be provided.

No doubt, China is interested in the export of Russian mineral and energy resources along the NSR to its domestic market, as well as the inclusion of the NSR in the “Polar Silk Road” project to expand opportunities for exports of Chinese goods to the demands of other countries. Freedom of navigation and its liberalization along the NSR provide more advantages for China than enough rigidly regimented control at which Russia insists [9, pp. 17–31].

⁶¹Bochkov D. Zachem Kitayu Arktika? [Why does China need Arctic?]. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/danil-bochkov/33820/?sphrase_id=28424984 (accessed 11 May 2019). (In Russ.)

Russia is not opposed to Chinese investments, incl. those aimed at the NSR infrastructure development, incl. the construction and modernization of ports, terminals, and railways. The NSR as part of the “One Belt and One Road” or the “Ice Silk Road” to connect Europe and China through the Arctic Ocean is also not contrary to the economic interests of Moscow. Russia would receive dividends from the involvement of foreign shipping companies, incl. Chinese⁶². On the other hand, in 2014, the Ministry of Transport of China released national Leadership for the Chinese Navigation along the Northern Sea Route, and the same concerning the Canadian Northwest Passage. Even from a legal point of view, it does not look entirely appropriate [16, Kienko E. V., p. 22].

China's interest in the development and use of Arctic living and non-living resources is clear, as it is a guarantee of China's further social and economic development. However, the Arctic — is an exceptionally vulnerable marine area, and it raises reasonable questions: is China technologically ready for the development of these resources? Has the country relevant technologies, incl. green ones?

Moreover, although China is actively promoting its concern about climate change, marine environment, and biodiversity in the Arctic, several points cause an absolute surprise. E.g., according to statistics, China is the world's most significant source of carbon dioxide emissions, and they account for about 30% of the total volume. Energy (coal) and heavy industry are the primary sources of emissions in China [15, Timo Koivurova, pp. 39–43]. At the same time, a considerable amount of air pollutants in the Arctic comes directly from China and other countries of Southeast Asia. It is noteworthy that Beijing does not cooperate and does not discuss these issues in the Arctic Council.

Chinese care about the living standard of the native population of the North appears to be quite hypocritical: Beijing actively discusses these problems not only in the UN but also in the Arctic Council. But Beijing sees topics related to the Tibetan people and the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous area taboo issues. Beijing is not willing to discuss them.

As a result, China's position on the Arctic grounds on the idea of a joint maritime region, where the interests of all states, incl. those outside the area, have own legitimate reasons to exist. China has set itself the main task — to make the control mode in the Arctic even more perfect, to develop and introduce specific new international rules to guarantee the rights of all interested parties in the region. Such a position is precisely one: Beijing is eager to question the exclusive nature of the collaboration between the Arctic Five (Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the USA), and replace it with a more inclusive mode based on the greater involvement of non-regional states and players. We are talking about the internationalization of the Arctic space and resources for the sake of some abstract “international community.” This approach seems not only meet the

⁶² At the Petersburg Economic Forum 2019, it was signed an agreement to establish a joint venture of “Novatek”, “Sovcomflot”, Chinese “Cosco Shipping” and the “Silk Road” fund to ensure the year-round navigation on the NSR]. URL: <http://www.morvesti.ru/detail.php?ID=79016> (accessed 03 July 2019). (In Russ.)

national interests of the Russian Federation but also, without doubt, is unlikely to find adequate support from other Arctic states.

Conclusion

All the Arctic states are very interested in the north polar region is a zone of peace and cooperation. Development of international cooperation and interaction, from this point of view, will always guarantee the possibility of a dialogue in the Arctic even though some inter-state contradictions.

Here, of course, one could draw an analogy with the Antarctic Treaty and other international agreements of the Cold War to manage “common” spaces (the Outer Space Treaty 1966⁶³, the Treaty on the seabed⁶⁴), based on the limited “cooperation” principle. The Arctic, in the legal sense, can never be equated to the Antarctic, but the development of joint research, common interests to protect the marine environment and its biodiversity unite the two polar regions. Finally, communication between experts and researchers is to create an atmosphere of greater trust, which will inevitably be reflected in a higher political level. In 2017, an agreement was signed to strengthen scientific cooperation in the Arctic. It aimed to establish a new framework of relations both between the Arctic countries and between them and the rest of the non-regional states [17, Berkman P.A., Vylegzhanin A.N., Young O.R.].

Paradoxically, most of M.S. Gorbachev's ideas voiced in 1987 during his visit to Murmansk, i.e., peaceful cooperation for sustainable development of resources in the North and the Arctic, incl. the establishment of joint and mixed companies for the development of North Sea shelf; the scientific study of the Arctic and the coordination of international efforts in this area; a survey of native peoples of the North; protection of the environment of the North, incl. the radiation safety monitoring (land, air, and water); the NSR opening for foreign vessels under Soviet icebreaker assistance (with the right of approaching Soviet ports) [18, Fokin Y.E., Smirnov A., pp. 9–10] have not disappeared from the agenda of the Russian Arctic.

The main problem lies in the fact that many countries see the engagement in Arctic research and exploration as a convenient and straightforward tool for familiarizing with Arctic issues, incl. spatial and resource components. The concept of “science diplomacy” is often applied to the Arctic⁶⁵. No doubt, many global problems there, i.e., climate change, melting of Arctic ice, pollution of the seas and oceans, protection of the marine environment and biodiversity cannot be solved alone or only by the Arctic Five. However, the regional states tend to a precise balance be-

⁶³ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/outer_space_governing.shtml (accessed 18 May 2019).

⁶⁴ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof. URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/seabed_wmd_prohibition.shtml (accessed 18 May 2019).

⁶⁵ See, e.g.: Nauchnaya diplomatiya: sotrudnichestvo Rossii i SShA v Arktike [Science diplomacy: cooperation of Russia and the US in the Arctic]. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/news/v-rsmd-obsudili-vklad-nauchnoy-diplomatii-v-razvitiie-mezhdunarodnogo-sotrudnichestva-v-arktike/> (accessed 10 July 2019). (In Russ.)

tween the interests of sustainable development and the solution to their problems in environmental, resource, food, and other aspects of national security.

The Russian Federation is in quite tricky conditions. Under the sanctions, on the one hand, Russia retains the extreme interest in the restoration of regional cooperation, and, on the other, it is forced to search for new partners and allies in the Arctic even if their interests and goal-setting are the same. That is why the choice of Arctic partners should be extraordinarily prudent and strategically verified.

References

1. Pedersen T. International Law and Politics in U.S. Policymaking: The United States and the Svalbard Dispute. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 2011, vol. 42, iss. 1–2, pp. 120–135.
2. Vylegzhanin A.N., Zilanov V.K., Savva V.M. *Pravovoy rezhim Shpitsbergena i prilegayushchikh morskikh rayonov* [Legal regime of Svalbard and adjacent marine areas]. Moscow, Norma Publ., 2019. 284 p. (In Russ.)
3. Pilyasov A.N., Kotov A.V. *Potentsial rossiyskoy Arktiki dlya mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva: doklad № 17/2015* [The potential of the Russian Arctic for international cooperation: report no. 17/2015]. Moscow, Spetskniga Publ., 2015. 120 p. (In Russ.)
4. Pedersen T. The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 2006, vol. 37, iss. 3–4, pp. 339–358.
5. Anderson D.H. The Status under International Law of the Maritime Areas around Svalbard. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 2009, vol. 40, iss. 4, pp. 373–384.
6. Vylegzhanin A.N., Young O.R., Berkman P.A. Governing the Barents Sea Region: Current Status, Emerging Issues, and Future Options. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 2018, vol. 49, iss. 1, pp. 52–78.
7. Pedersen T. Denmark's Policies Toward the Svalbard Area. *Ocean Development & International Law*, 2009, vol. 40, iss. 4, pp. 319–332.
8. *Strany-nablyudateli v Arkticheskom sovete: pozitsiya i motivy deyatel'nosti* [Observer countries in the Arctic Council: position and motives]. Moscow, ANO Publ., 2014. 102 p. (In Russ.)
9. Ivanov I.S., ed. *Aziatskie igroki v Arktike: interesy, vozmozhnosti, perspektivy: Doklad № 26/2016* [Asian players in the Arctic: interests, opportunities, prospects: Report no. 26/2016]. Moscow, RIAC Publ., 2016, 56 p. (In Russ.)
10. Gutenev M.Yu. Arkticheskaya politika Tokio: istoriya i sovremennost' [The Arctic policy of Tokyo: history and modernity]. *Vestnik ZabGU* [Transbaikal State University Journal], 2017, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 75–83. (In Russ.)
11. Mogilevkin I.M. *Transport i kommunikatsii: proshloe, nastoyashchee, budushchee* [Transport and communications: past, present, future]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 2005. 356 p. (In Russ.)
12. Zhuravel' V.P. Kitay, Respublika Koreya, Yaponiya v Arktike: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost' [China, Republic of Korea and Japan in the Arctic: politics, economy, security]. *Arktika i Sever* [Arctic and North], 2016, no. 24, pp. 112–144. (In Russ.)
13. Gutenev M.Yu. Natsional'nye interesy Yuzhnoy Korei v Arktike [National interests of South Korea in the Arctic]. *Problemy dal'nego Vostoka*, 2019, no. 1, pp. 46–53. (In Russ.)
14. Dongmin J., Won-sang S., Seokwoo L. Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea. *Ocean and Coastal Law Journal*, 2017, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 85–96.
15. Koivurova T., Kauppila L., Kopra S., Lanteigne M., Shi M., Smieszek M. (Gosia), and Stepien A. in cooperation with Käpylä J., Mikkola H., Þór Niélsson E. and Nojonen M. *China in the Arctic; and the Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese-Finnish Arctic Co-operation. Publications of the Government's analysis, assessment and research activities*, 2019. 106 p.
16. Kienko E.V. Mezhdunarodno-pravovaya kharakteristika arkticheskoy politiki Kitaya [International legal framework of the Arctic policy of the people's republic of China]. *Moskovskiy zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava* [Moscow Journal of International Law], 2017, no. 3, pp. 18–30. (In Russ.)

17. Berkman P.A., Vylegzhanin A.N., Young O.R. Application and Interpretation of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. *Moskovskiy zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava* [Moscow Journal of International Law], 2017, no. 3, pp. 6–17.
18. Fokin Yu.E., Smirnov A.I. *Kirkenesskaya Deklaratsiya o sotrudnichestve v Barentsevom / Evroarktich-eskom regione: vzglyad iz Rossii 20 let spustya* [Kirkenes declaration on cooperation in the Barents / Euro-Arctic region: a view from Russia 20 years later]. Moscow, 2012. 88 p. (In Russ.)